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It might not matter very much whether insects are conscious
Commentary on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds
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Abstract: In common with most other authors, Mikhalevich & Powell assume that phenomenal
consciousness is a “precondition” of moral standing. Although the evidence they present makes it
much more likely than usually thought that arthropods are phenomenally conscious, scepticism in
the face of this evidence remains intellectually respectable. I suggest that we best make progress
here by rejecting the notion that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral standing.
Mental states that may lack phenomenal properties can do a lot of work in grounding moral
standing, and there is less room for scepticism about these mental states than about phenomenal
consciousness.
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“Phenomenal consciousness” (or “sentience”) refers to the qualitative feeling associated with
some mental states. There is something it is like to be in these states: felt qualities are associated
with listening to music, smelling flowers, maddening itches, and so on. While almost no one is
sceptical that other normal human beings are phenomenally conscious, there is extensive debate
about agents in pathological states (e.g., those in persistent vegetative states) and about other
animals.
These debates matter because phenomenal consciousness matters. It matters because
phenomenal states seem to be intrinsically pleasant or unpleasant. Pain and pleasure are the
obvious examples. Being in pain feels bad, and for that reason, to the extent to which someone is
in pain, their life is going worse than it would otherwise; the reverse is true for pleasure, because
it feels good. So knowing whether humans in pathological states or non-human animals are
phenomenally conscious is important: it matters to how we should treat them.
Debates over humans in pathological states remain unresolved, but there is a near
consensus among scientists over the phenomenal consciousness of mammals and some other
animals. Nearly a decade ago, the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al. 2012)
summed up this consensus: consciousness extends beyond humans to mammals and birds “and
many other creatures”. But which other creatures? The declaration explicitly mentions only
octopuses. There is increasing acceptance that other cephalopods are phenomenally conscious
too. But there is little willingness to ascribe consciousness to invertebrates.
Focusing on arthropods, Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) set out to challenge this
assumption. Those who deny that arthropods are conscious are usually ignorant of their cognitive
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complexity. It is very likely that this ignorance helps explains why most people are confident that
they are not conscious: we think of them as simple automata, whose behaviour consists of
stereotypies and reflexes. The evidence M&P review for the existence of cognitive capacities like
numerosity and the capacity to discriminate stimuli with no conceivable analogues in the
environment to which they’re adapted (like impressionist versus cubist paintings) testifies to the
complexity and flexibility of arthropod cognition.
As M&P note, however, it remains possible to deny that arthropods are conscious in the
face of this evidence. This would not be just idle scepticism, of the sort that points to the logical
possibility that other people do not possess minds and concludes that we can’t know that we’re
not the sole thinking beings in the universe. Since we have excellent reason to think that minds,
including their phenomenal states, are realized by brains, and we know that other humans and
many other animals too have brains like ours, we have reason to think that they have minds like
ours. But we don’t have such reasons with regard to arthropods. Their brains are very different
from ours, so we lack grounds for this argument from analogy. Things would be different if we
were in possession of a well-founded and detailed neurofunctional account of consciousness, on
the basis of which we could assess whether structures in arthropod brains played the right roles
to realize consciousness. Although there are plenty of proposals around (the Global Workspace
Theory (Baars 2005), Integrated Information Theory (Tononi et al. 2016) and so on), none have
achieved consensus.
In the face of this problem, M&P point to influences on our thought that might illicitly lead
us to deny consciousness to arthropods (the disgust response, the unjustified belief that they lack
complex cognition, and so on) and suggest that we ought to be less sceptical. They also point to
moral risks here: false negatives have moral costs (in terms of the imposition of suffering, for
example) that false positives lack, and urge us to assign significant weight to the possibility that
arthropods are conscious in making decisions. All of that is well taken. But there is reason to think
we can go further.
M&P accept the near universal view that phenomenal consciousness is “a precondition for
moral standing”. It’s this assumption that makes trouble, because we lack a detailed
understanding of the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Fortunately, there are good
reasons to reject the assumption. Perhaps phenomenal consciousness is sufficient for moral
standing, but it is not a precondition.
Much of the work done by appeals to phenomenal consciousness can in fact be done by
functionalizable properties of the mind. Kahane & Savulescu (2009) argue, for example, that
phenomenal consciousness is important because it is required for having a point of view. But
that’s surely false: having a point of view requires some sort of cognitive unity and executive
function, not phenomenality. Seager (2001) argues that only phenomenally conscious beings can
value things. But that too seems false: having beliefs and goals seems sufficient for valuing states
of affairs, and these are functionalizable states.
More generally, there are good reasons to think that what our mental states feel like to
us (if anything) plays only a minor role in whether we have lives that are valuable to us: whether
we achieve a sense of satisfaction or frustration from failing to achieve our goals (Levy 2014).
Satisfaction and frustration need not feel like anything: they can be cashed out cognitively and in
terms of functional properties. Is it really an inner glow that makes achieving a long-sought goal
valuable? Or is it the knowledge that we’ve worked hard for it and overcome obstacles? Is it really
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a feeling that makes the death of a loved one bad? Or is it the knowledge that we’ll never see
them again? Phenomenal consciousness may contribute a great deal to the (dis)value of these
states, but they are good or bad for us to some degree independently of how they feel.
Since it is not, or not only, the ways in which things feel for us that make them good or
bad, we need not worry about the apparent ineffability of phenomenal consciousness. We can go
a long way toward an inclusive animal ethics by studying only their cognition. Much of the
evidence Mikhalevich & Powell should therefore be seen as bearing directly on the moral status
of arthropods, rather than as bearing on that status only by constituting evidence for their
consciousness.
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